by Sudhir Vombatkere
I am deeply
saddened. The cause is the 7 Sep 2012 Indian Express front page, top-headlined
article, “Major 'uploads' photos of Lt Col, his wife on porn sites”. This act
of utter depravity and moral corruption following the several scandalous
exposes of senior military officers involved in money corruption scandals makes
it all the more hard to bear. To add to all this affecting the officer corps,
the incidents of mutiny, near-mutiny, officer-OR scuffles and face-offs,
fragging, and so on, only deepen the sadness. I ask myself, “Where have we as
an organization gone wrong?”, “Have I done my duty adequately during my own service
to keep the moral flag of our army flying high?”, “Have we always treated
Philip Chetwode's dictum upside down in real life even though we swear after
the Passing-Out Parade to put country first, the men next and self last 'always
and everytime'?”
That such scandals are being put on the front pages of
newspapers and discussed on prime-time TV is good, because hiding the reality
can only make things worse, not better. Of course, there are those amongst us
who will say that media (print & electronic) blows things out of
proportion. Perhaps that is so, but then can there be smoke without fire? I am
not concerned whether or to what extent the fact of each scandal is blown up
(and the reasons therefor) but with the fact itself. Our JCOs/OR are fully aware
of what is reported in the media. What standing would the officer corps in
general have with the men they command when such utter moral depravity and lack
of integrity among the officer corps becomes the subject of (gleeful?
disgusted? angry?) discussion in the JCO Mess and OR Dining Hall or barracks?
This is not of course, to even imply
that the majority of officers are corrupt, but such scandals rolling out
especially in the last may be 7-8 years takes one to the inevitable conclusion
that a substantial number of officers are involved in corrupt practices. And
when I say “corrupt practices”, I include all those practices of taking or using
what is not legitimately entitled or owned, regardless of scale in terms of
quantity or of depravity. It is facile for me to say that all this is happening
long after I retired, and the army was “okay” when I left it, but such things
do not happen in months or even a couple of years. Surely, we must admit, the
seeds of the current depravity and corruption were sown even when we were in
service in the last century. We, myself included, have to accept at least a
part of the responsibility.
One of the ways in which the
now-retired generation of officers has failed (and the practice continues, as
young and middle-level officers now in service assure me) is that IOs have not
ensured that incompetent or fawning/bum-sucking or career-manipulative or
corrupt officers do not get promoted, by giving them low ACR grades. The
reasons for not writing off such officers is that the IO himself lacks both
competence and courage, or himself has something to hide, or has received
favours or services from the officer on whom he reports. However, how often
have we seen officers who make mistakes or who are argumentative or “difficult”
getting written off by their IOs so easily. All this falls under the general
rubric of command failure of the IO himself. And we have all been IOs at some
level or the other. Worse, every IO has his IO, who fails to recognize the
command failure, and the system perpetuates such that mediocre or undesirable
officers get promoted and eventually rise to general rank.
I am pretty sure that the (by now many)
general officers named in corruption scandals or the middle-level officers
involved in the 7 Sep 2012 Indian Express report of moral corruption, received
good to very good ACRs from their IOs. (Maj Gen V.K.Madhok, in his undated
recent letter No. No/VKM/Army/2 to the Defence Minister, writes, “It is of
interest to note that nearly 80-90% officers are graded as Above Average by the
IOs as they don’t want trouble in their units, or representations”). And surely
many of today's retired officers were the IOs of the general officers in
corruption scandals. (Happily, I am not one of those, but one never knows what
scandal the morrow may bring forth, to shame me that the corrupt officer was
one to whose promotion, the ACR that I initiated contributed). Of course people
change as they get promoted (or kicked upstairs), and some change for the
better, but the majority probably change for the worse, in accordance with the
laws of social entropy. Norman Dixon's book “The Psychology of Military
Incompetence” brings out issues of command failure, but does not deal with
corruption or moral depravity.
Of the officer-JCO/OR or senior
officer-junior officer (or in general, the commander-commanded) relationship,
the time that officers get with their command is reduced for one or more of
several reasons, and this impacts adversely on the relationship which, today,
is far from being even satisfactory. It is easy to say that it is not the
“quantity” of time alone that counts but the quality of available time spent,
though that is essentially true. But I would say some of the important reasons
are as follows. One, the shortage of officers and the hard-scale posting being
much less than the authorized strength even in operational units makes officers'
available time with troops less. Two, the insistence at higher command levels
on unnecessary paper work that kills much of officers' time. Also, especially
in staff jobs, officers sit late in office on a regular basis either because
they are inefficient, or because they are overloaded (poor time-management,
taking the load of under-performing colleagues, etc), or because their senior
sits late and he does not have the guts to go home even when he has completed
his assigned work. Thus, officers in units and certainly officers on staff
rarely if ever get to see how and where their JCO/OR live. Three, the undue
emphasis given to physical and material comfort of officers by officers
themselves. Four, the skewed welfare that is practiced even at the institutional
level. As an example of this, one may see that over the years, the AWHO (noting
what “W” stands for) has constructed far more officers' dwellings than
dwellings for JCOs/OR, even though the overwhelming numerical strength is that
of the latter category.
The functioning of AWWA also leaves much to be desired. There are other burning issues like separate (vastly superior) ration scales for officers, vastly superior accomodation scales and specifications for officers, diversion of disproportionate CSD Canteen profits to Officers' Messes, etc., which need immediate re-examination from the welfare point of view. Five, in spite of instructions and orders, many, many officers use their sahayaks to walk their pet dogs, and perform household chores like a domestic servant, while the officer's wife orders the sahayak about. This has never gone down well in any unit, and it is the “skill” of the CO and the Senior JCO that allows this practice to continue without too many disciplinary problems arising out of protests from OR. Six, there is the very important point of leadership and command, to which I will devote a separate (following) paragraph.
The functioning of AWWA also leaves much to be desired. There are other burning issues like separate (vastly superior) ration scales for officers, vastly superior accomodation scales and specifications for officers, diversion of disproportionate CSD Canteen profits to Officers' Messes, etc., which need immediate re-examination from the welfare point of view. Five, in spite of instructions and orders, many, many officers use their sahayaks to walk their pet dogs, and perform household chores like a domestic servant, while the officer's wife orders the sahayak about. This has never gone down well in any unit, and it is the “skill” of the CO and the Senior JCO that allows this practice to continue without too many disciplinary problems arising out of protests from OR. Six, there is the very important point of leadership and command, to which I will devote a separate (following) paragraph.
Today, as compared with the past, the
socio-economic distance between the commander and the commanded has shrunk, because
the youth from the upper middle class are going into corporate jobs and officer
intake is from the lower middle class, including children of JCOs/OR. Thus many
of today's young and middle-level officers are very conscious of their roots
but do not want to show it to their command, with the result that they go to
lengths to maintain their “officer” status by being peremptory and sometimes
harsh. At the same time, today's JCOs/OR are more critical of officers, with an
approach of “How is he any better than me? But he wields authority (granting
leave, awarding punishments, etc) harshly”. The outcome of this is incidents
like even refusal of leave (of course refusal of leave also happens because of
short postings and absences on course, leave and hospital), which sometimes
gets out of hand. Then there are cases like the OR who climbed a mobile tower
in Delhi alleging mistreatment by his own officers and refusing to come down
until he was allowed to meet the Defence Minister. This indicates that the OR
has lost faith in the sense of justice and fair play from his own officers.
Indeed, the fact that officers of various ranks (including several Lt Gens)
have gone to civil court on a variety of causes, indicates that they too have
little faith in fair play and justice in the very system in which they are
themselves in the policy-making and decision-making levels!
The point to be made here is that the officer corps does not provide to the subordinate Offr/JCO/OR hierarchy, the atmosphere of fair play and justice tempered with empathy and compassion, which it is expected to do as a part of the command function. Creating systemic fair play and justice, far from going against maintaining the necessary distance between the commander and the commanded, gives the subordinate faith in the system and loyalty to the team, be it in units or headquarters. In earlier times, officers played troops games and so got to regularly meet with their men on a one-to-one basis. Many or even most of today's young and middle level officers do not play troops games (I am open to correction in this regard), for they would rather play golf or other so-called officers' games where they get the opportunity to meet and become “visible” to senior officers, which is “good” for promotion. The senior officer also often only gets to see his juniors who make themselves “visible” for, even in Officers' Mess functions, senior officers stand apart and keep each other company, while the young and middle-level officers form their own separate groups, and in higher HQ mess functions, as often as not, the liquor and food served to senior ranks is qualitatively superior. All these go to stratify officers amongst themselves and officers from JCOs/OR.
The point to be made here is that the officer corps does not provide to the subordinate Offr/JCO/OR hierarchy, the atmosphere of fair play and justice tempered with empathy and compassion, which it is expected to do as a part of the command function. Creating systemic fair play and justice, far from going against maintaining the necessary distance between the commander and the commanded, gives the subordinate faith in the system and loyalty to the team, be it in units or headquarters. In earlier times, officers played troops games and so got to regularly meet with their men on a one-to-one basis. Many or even most of today's young and middle level officers do not play troops games (I am open to correction in this regard), for they would rather play golf or other so-called officers' games where they get the opportunity to meet and become “visible” to senior officers, which is “good” for promotion. The senior officer also often only gets to see his juniors who make themselves “visible” for, even in Officers' Mess functions, senior officers stand apart and keep each other company, while the young and middle-level officers form their own separate groups, and in higher HQ mess functions, as often as not, the liquor and food served to senior ranks is qualitatively superior. All these go to stratify officers amongst themselves and officers from JCOs/OR.
Another point is the highly permissive
so-called modern (western) style of dress and deportment that many officers and
their wives pretend to. Promiscuity among officers and their families is not
new. When I was ADG DV, I had handled cases of “key clubs” and “wife-swapping”
among officers, being processed for disciplinary action for militarily
unacceptable behaviour. But today, the ambitions of some officers (and
sometimes of their wives) drives them to offer or seek sexual favours from
other officers wives, and I am aware of at least one instance of a senior officer's
wife calling some young officer home when her husband was working habitually
late in office to “earn” his promotion. It is mercifully true that these are
rare cases, but they are known to most officers and their wives, and finally
nothing can be totally hidden from the sahayak who silently observes and speaks
with his barrack-mates especially when his tongue is loosened with rum. Thus
the loose morals of a few officers is thrust by loose tongues on the whole
officer corps, while only the really professionally competent officers who are
few in number (here professional competence is not only being good at his work
but includes good command and control with justice and fair play to run an
effective and happy team), command respect.
I also note that in retired life, most
officers are largely unconcerned with the problems of JCOs/OR in general, but
may engage themselves with the post-retirement problems of JCOs/OR of their own
regiment. They are engaged in the rat race of a post-retirement job to earn more
(true, some have on-going commitments of children still to be settled or aged
parents, and need to supplement their pension) to live an extravagant
life-style, or as they claim, “I have to keep busy, and cannot simply sit at
home”. But little or no thought is given to JCOs/OR whose post-retirement life
is one of struggle to live a half-decent life and bring up his family on a
meagre pension. JCO/OR Veterans are, in general, quite unhappy with the
attitude of Officer Veterans. These remarks are made based on my personal
experience since I retired in 1996 and settled in Mysore, and observations in
other places. I believe that an officer's command responsibility should
continue voluntarily into retirement.
I am sure there will be many who read
this mail, who will send in angry responses, pointing out how wrong I am. But
even they will not be able to assert that all is well with our Army (and Navy
and Air Force). We have to accept that the military's morale is nowhere as good
as it should be for a fighting force to be really effective in war. There is an urgent need for all Veterans
to not merely introspect but to take positive action to recommend to the
Service Chiefs openly as to what needs to be done to retrieve the situation of
deteriorating morale.This responsibility
rests with all Veterans and especially Veterans of general rank. It would have more effect if a
conclave of officers would get together to formulate a “white paper” or “status
paper” and make action-oriented recommendations for immediate implementation at
Services HQ.
Apart from the above, one of the most
important strategic issues for this conclave to agitate for is creating the
appointment of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) who will be National Security
Advisor (External Security) in addition to the present bureaucrat who is the
sole National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister who heads the National
Security Council.
This December, the surviving officers
of my course (30 Regular) meet at IMA to commemorate 50 years since
commissioning. It will be a joy to meet those whom we have not met at all after
December 1962, renew contact with those whom we may have met in the intervening
half century, and remember coursemates who lost their lives in operations or
otherwise. But now in early September, one cannot but help feeling a sense of
deja vu that we felt 50 years ago as GCs in IMA, when an under-equipped Army
with poor top leadership, further weakened because of political incompetence
and bureaucratic arrogance, was shamed by China. We can safely assert that
today as in the past, we have the best troops in the world, and that our junior
officers' leadership-from-the-front is second to none as they have always
demonstrated, most recently in war in Kargil 1999, and daily in on-going CI
ops). But I personally find it impossible to be so confident when speaking of
middle-level and especially senior officers. I shall continue to hope that I am
wrong regarding senior officers, but I have a strong feeling that I am right.
Correction of the present deteriorating trend needs to begin at the highest
levels, for only then will it trickle down; a bottom-up approach cannot be much
more than cosmetic.
The
way forward
The need of the hour is for definite,
concerted and assertive action to form a conclave as suggested above. One hopes
that retired Service Chiefs and retired Lt Gens will take the initiative to
form such a conclave, invite comments and suggestions from across the rank
spectrum, and produce a valuable document on a (self-imposed) time-bound basis.
Delay may have very serious consequences not only for our Army, Navy and Air
Force, but for our Country as a whole. At
least now, let the country come first, and the “men you command” come next.
Maj Gen S.G.Vombatkere (Retd)
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